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Greg Parnell, FS 
Yearly, the Dr Wilbur B. Payne Memorial 
Awardfor Excellence in Analysis is award-
ed to military operations researchers. The 
presentation of a Special Payne Award is 
an infrequent event given for exceptional 
analysis, often covering a span of several 
years. A Special Payne Award was award-
ed in 2005 and was presented by the 
. Deputy Under Secretary of the Army 
(Operations Research), Walter Hollis 
[FSj. It reads: 
For exceptionally meritorious 
achievement as a member of the 
Center for Army Analysis (CAA) 
analytic support team to Army Base 
Realignment and Closure (BRAC) 
for the CAA 2005 BRAC Analysis 
Support for the Army Basing Study 
(TABS), Assistant Chief of Staff for 
Installations (ACSIM). The team 
used unique and innovative applica-
tions of state-of-the-art operations 
research modeling, analysis tech-
niques and skills to provide rigorous, 
timely, and analytically supportable 
critical Army BRAC recommenda-
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tions to the Army senior leadership. 
The team s commitment to excellence 
reflects great credit on you, the CAA 
analytic support team to Army BRA C, 
and the United States Army. Signed by 
Francis J. Harvey, Secretary of the 
Army. 
I requested the authors write this article, 
outlining their contributions which led to 
their receiving this prestigious award. 
E.B. Vandiver III, FS 
Director, Center for Army Analysis 
L ast November, the 2005 round of Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) recommendations became 
law. These recommendations will help 
reshape the Army by closing 400 installa-
tions (13 active components, 176 Army 
Reserve Centers, and 211 National Guard 
Armories) and realigning 56 active com-
ponents. The actions will impact 43 states, 
cost about $13 billion, and generate an 
expected 20-year net savings of $7.6 bil-
lion. After BRAC completion, the Army 
expects recurring savings of $1.5 billion 
annually, 1.7 times greater than the recur-
ring Army savings of the prior four BRAC 
rounds combined. 
How were these Army BRAC actions 
decided and what was the role of operations 
research in the decision making process? 
We outline the role of analysis in the BRAC 
2005 process, emphasizing the most influ-
ential drivers: long-term planning; data col-
lection and validation; development of 
models; selection and training of key ana-
lysts; analysis flexibility; bold execution; 
and, analysis transparency. We also share 
our views on some of the deliberations and 
the decision making process. 
BRAe 2005 Background 
The Department of Defense conducted 
four BRAC rounds from 1988 to 1995, in 
which the Army closed 112 installations 
and realigned 26 others as well as numer-
ous laboratory sites. These prior rounds 
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had costs of$5.6 billion and produced $9.8 
billion in savings, with annual recurring 
savings of$0.9 billion [Department of the 
Army 2005].1 In spite of these improve-
ments, the Department and the Army 
believed there remained surplus installation 
capacity and opportunities for additional 
savings. 
In November 2002, the Secretary of 
Defense stated that, while BRAC 2005 
must continue to pursue the reduction of 
surplus infrastructure, it "can make an even 
more profound contribution to transform-
ing the Department by rationalizing our 
infrastructure with defense strategy. 
BRAC 2005 should be the means by which 
we reconfigure our current infrastructure 
into one in which operational capacity 
maximizes both warfighting capability and 
efficiency" [Department of the Army 
2005].1 
The Army embraced this guidance and 
viewed BRAC 2005 as a critical compo-
nent of its transformation. BRAC 2005 
enables the Army to reshape the infra-
structure supporting current and future 
forces, making them even more relevant 
and combat ready for combatant com-
manders [Department ofthe Army 2005].1 
Up front Analyst Reflections 
BRAC 2005 was a challenging and 
rewarding experience. We expected a high-
ly charged and stressful environment; we 
were not disappointed. As in any important 
and high impact analysis, politics was a pri-
mary concern. Before and during the 
BRAC analysis, and still today, we are con-
tinuously asked how politics influenced the 
analysis and final BRAC decisions. In 
regards to the latter, politics may have 
played a part in some of the final BRAC 
recommendations, though they did not 
affect the way we conducted our analysis. 
We were able to mitigate political interfer-
ence at our level primarily through two 
techniques: objectivity and transparency. 
We did not use any constraints to force any 
decision for political reasons. If the lead- .. 
(See ARMY BRAe 2005,p.1O) 
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ership made a decision that contradicted one 
of our analysis recommendations, we 
responded with sensitivity analysis that 
highlighted unintended consequences with 
that particular decision. By not building in 
arbitrary political constraints, we helped the 
senior Army leadership make informed 
decisions. Additionally, we relied on a 
transparent modeling and analysis process 
to help others accept the Army recommen-
dations. Transparency was critical to justi-
fying recommendations to the auditing 
agencies and the BRAC 2005 Commission. 
Final solutions were centered on maneuver 
land and growing requirements for that 
land, which made sense to the Army lead-
ership and to the analysts. Future require-
ments were uncertain which added com-
plexity to the both the analysis and the 
decisions regarding closures. We complet-
ed sensitivity analysis and used subject mat-
ter experts to develop quality estimates 
whenever possible. 
BRAe 2005 Organization 
The Secretary of Defense received can-
didate BRAC recommendations from the 
Infrastructure Steering Group and each 
service. The organization and analysis for 
each service differed substantially [Defense 
Base Closure and Realignment Commis-
sion 2005].2 The Army Senior Review 
Group (SRG) oversaw all aspects of Army 
analysis. Dr Craig College, Deputy Assis-
tant Secretary of the Army for Infrastructure 
Analysis, reported directly to the SRG. Dr 
College also led The Army Basing Study, 
(TABS) the group responsible for generat-
ing the Army's recommendations for clo-
sure and realignment and coordinating all 
Army BRAC 2005 analysis. TABS asked 
the Center for Army Analysis (CAA) to 
dedicate an analysis cell to provide direct 
support for the duration ofBRAC 2005. In 
addition, the United States Military Acade-
my, the Naval Postgraduate School, and 
others provided expert advice and analysis. 
Long-Term Planning 
The Army began planning for BRAC 
2005 before the round was legislated. In 
2000, in preparation for the 2001 Qua-
drennial Defense Review, Mr E. B. Van-
diver III, FS, Director ofCAA, authorized 
(then LTC) Bill Tarantino to form a sta-
tioning analysis cell within CAA. This cell 
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Figure 1. Analysis overview and timeline, primary models, and analysis products. The 
timeline includes different BRAC 2005 steps that begin prior to the 2001 QDR and 
continued with the development and employment of analyses tools through the BRAC 
scenario development and analysis phase in 2004. Primary phases included data col-
lection and military value analysis, scenario development and selection, cost, envi-
ronmental, and economic analyses. The military value portfolio analysis was con-
ducted using the IEM. The IEM consisted of two models, the Military Value of 
Installations model (multi-objective decision analysis) and the Military Value Portfo-
lio model (integer programming model). Many other models were used to conduct 
scenario, cost, and stationing analysis, e.g., OSAF (Optimal Stationing of Army Forcesl 
and COBRA (Cost of Base Realignment Actions) [Department of the Army 2005). 
Once candidate recommendations were developed, the Option Development and Eval-
uation Module or ODEM (Option Value Model (OVM) and Option Portfolio Model 
(OPM) helped the Senior Review Group evaluate candidate recommendations for 
inclusion in the Army's final recommendations. 
collected and validated Army facility, range, 
and training land data; designed installation 
and stationing analysis tools; and trained 
personnel to conduct stationing analysis for 
the Army's Deputy Chief of Staff for Oper-
ations and Plans (G-3), the Assistant Secre-
tary for Installations and Environment, and 
the Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation 
Management. With assistance from Dr 
Rob Dell, CAA began thinking about the 
"next" BRAC, and how to improve their 
stationing analysis capabilities. This long-
term planning and preparation proved valu-
able. 
In 2003, MAl Lee Ewing took control 
of the Stationing Analysis Cell at CAA, 
while COL Tarantino moved to TABS to 
become Chief of the Modeling and Support 
Team. Planning shifted to the near term. 
Even though TABS and CAA had not 
received official BRAC guidance, the Army 
BRAC analysis team (the TABS Modeling 
and Support Team and the CAA Stationing 
Analysis Cell) developed a time line and 
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analysis plan, estimating the time required 
to refine existing models, collect and man-
age data, and develop decision analysis 
models and linear integer programming 
models to support Military Value Analysis, 
Scenario Selection, and Economic Analysis 
(Figure 1). 
The BRAC legislation passed by Con-
gress specified that military value would 
drive decisions for the BRAC Commission 
and the military. Our challenge was to 
determine how to solve a complex multiple 
objective problem and also consider the 
qualitative aspects in our analysis, which 
would be beneficial to decision makers. In 
retrospect, this situation is not unusual. All 
major strategy or policy analysis involves 
competing objectives, many are naturally 
qualitative. Very early in our planning we 
decided to use multiple objective decision 
analysis in conjunction with mathematical 
optimization models. TABS asked Dr Greg 
Parnell, FS to assist with the decision 
analysis needed for the military value devel-
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opment. Figure 1 illustrates the primary 
models and analysis products used to 
inform the SRG. The IEM produced the 
portfolio of installations based on military 
value as required by Congress [Department 
of the Army 2005].1 
Once the SRG approved the installation 
portfolio, TABS generated the candidate 
recommendations and conducted scenario 
analysis on these candidate recommenda-
tions. TABS evaluated all viable scenario 
costs :.vith the COBRA model [Department 
of the Army 2005].1 CAA and TABS eval-
uated brigade stationing options, including 
the restationing of units from Europe and 
Korea using the OSAF model [e.g., Dell 
and Tarantino 2003].3 
We viewed the Military Value Analysis 
as a cornerstone of the BRAC analysis, 
requiring senior leader involvement, a 
mathematically sound model, and dis-
cernible results. For example, the analysis 
did not compare installations ona "1 to n" 
ranking of any prioritization list, but, 
instead, focused the decision maker on 
installations (or other entities) within each 
quartile of a list. Another key point was to 
seek an answer to the question "what is 
important?" Throughout the analysis, we 
found constraining factors, for example, 
only 11 Army installations have more than 
10,000 buildable acres and linear con-
straints (Army level) that give the impres-
sion of excess, but installation level analy-
sis indicates a shortage of buildable acres 
for many of the these large installations. All 
of these issues are addressed within the Mil-
itary Value Analysis and other analyses 
mentioned below that focus on the most 
important installation characteristics. 
Preparation of People and Tools 
Development ofthe CAA stationing cell 
was key. In addition to MAJ Ewing, the 
CAA cell consisted of Mr Jeff Bassichis, 
Mr John Bott, and Mr Richard Pedersen 
(all winners of a Special Payne Award in 
2005). Other contributors included Linda 
Coblentz, Dr Charles Leake, and Mr Joe 
McGill, who completed individual studies. 
The stationing cell is located in CAA's 
Resource Analysis Division, under the lead-
ership ofMr David Russo. Each cell mem-
ber had a graduate degree in Operations 
Research or a related discipline and each 
was an expert in Army facilities database 
management, facilities engineering, opti-
mization, and/or decision analysis. 
In 2001, CAA updated the COBRA 
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model to a Microsoft Windows [Microsoft, 
2005]4 environment with increased capa-
bility. This enabled the BRAC COBRA 
Joint Project Action Team to prepare 
COBRA for all the services and the Joint 
Cross Service Groups, so it could be used 
for all cost analysis done in BRAC. CAA 
conducted numerous stationing studies 
from 2001 to 2003, using analysis tools 
such as OSAF [e.g., Conners et aI, 2001, 
Tarantino,2002].5,6 The early deployment 
and use of OSAF and COBRA prepared 
analysts for BRAC 2005 analysis. 
A key to execution of an analysis plan 
lies in the flexibility of the plan. We attrib-
ute our success to several conscious deci-
sions by the authors and the Army leader-
ship. 
1. Focus on cost savings and transforma-
tion. The Government Accountability 
Office and the BRAC Commission 
accepted the Army's BRAC 1995 mili-
tary value analysis. Initially, there was 
institutional support to keep the status 
quo analysis ofBRAC 1995. Because of 
the mandate by the Secretary of Defense 
to include Defense and Army transfor-
mation in the military value analysis, we 
had to deviate from "business as usual." 
Given the ability to change, Dr College 
and the Army SRG supported a new 
BRAC 2005 military value approach. 
We cannot overemphasize the impor-
tance of transformation to our analysis. 
All of our decision models, and much of 
the sensitivity analysis we performed 
using optimization, emphasized the 
analysis of transformation options. For 
example, OSAF was used extensively to 
examine the effects of combining the 
infantry and armor schools on the sta-
tioning of combat brigades returning 
from Germany and Korea. 
2. Removal of the installation function 
constraint. We removed the BRAC 
1995 constraint that compared installa-
tions only within functions. We com-
pared all installations using one military 
value model, e.g., we evaluated Fort 
Hood (a maneuver installation) and 
Aberdeen Proving Ground (a test and 
evaluation installation) using the same 
military value model. Removing this 
constraint helped the Army develop 
more flexible realignment and closure 
options. 
3. We were bold in our analysis plan and 
execution. We delivered more analysis 
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than required to merely inform the 
BRAC decisions. Our analysis looked 
at the transformation options the Army 
leadership wanted to consider in the 
BRAC round, not only cost-saving alter-
natives. We considered risk to both the 
force and future Army budgets in all of 
our stationing analysis. 
Changing the past analysis approach, 
including the way the Army viewed instal-
lations, was a great success. More impor-
tantly, we made a difference with the qual-
ity of the BRAC solution. 
Analysis Transparency 
Transparent analysis enables flexibility 
and bold execution. The Army Audit 
Agency, the Government Accountability 
Office, and other participants from the 
BRAC Commission commented informal-
ly that the Army's analysis surpassed expec-
tations with its quality and transparency. 
Three areas that contributed to the trans-
parency of the Army's BRAC analysis are: 
I. Every step of the milttary value analysis 
was made available to the Army Audit 
Agency. The auditors questioned data, 
evaluated the models, and interviewed 
the analysts before results were released 
to the BRAC Commission. 
2. Even before we collected the first data, 
we began documentation. We continued 
documentation throughout more than 
two years ofBRAC analysis and made it 
available. This helped the Army Audit 
Agency and Government Accountabili-
ty Office to track the Army's modeling 
and analysis efforts, thus gaining the 
confidence of senior leadership and 
BRAC Commission members. 
3. We applied analysis in areas to reduce 
the appearance of ad hoc or subjective 
decisions. For example, we developed 
the Option Development and Evaluation 
Module (ODEM) [Department of the 
Army 2005] 1 to provide additional ana-
lytical rigor by reducing the subjective 
nature of selecting candidate recom-
mendations. 
Documentation is painful but necessary . 
(just like data management). Our recom-
mendations: start early, write all the time, 
and finish with a complete report of your 
effort; it pays off. Thorough documentation 
of our effort allows others to see what we 
(See ARMY BRAe 200S,p. 25). 
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with current and future Sponsors. There's a 
lot to be done in one year as President, and 
if elected, I pledge to provide the general 
membership with a Report Card at the Ple-
nary Session of the 76th MORSS in June 
2008, reminding you of what I said I'd do in 
this article and how well the Board thought 
I did. 
Biography 
Mr Jack Keane is currently serving as 
the Supervisor of the Aviation Systems Engi-
neering Group at the Johns Hopkins Uni-
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did and improve on our analysis in the 
future. 
Conclusions 
The Army BRAC 2005 study was 
planned for over two years and then suc-
cessfully executed in a 21h year study. Prior 
planning ensured the formation of a well-
trained analysis team who had been work-
ing stationing problems years before BRAC 
began. Most important, the BRAe com-
mission approved 95% of all the Army's 
closure and realignment recommenda-
tions. These decisions will ultimately help 
reshape the Army. 
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